different strings

February 29, 2004

NYT editorial on electronic voting machines

Adam Cohen has an excellent editorial in today's New York Times on the controversy over electronic voting machines. Cohen notes that while many of the allegations being made about possible voting fraud in recent elections cannot be proved, the crux of the problem is that the states involved can't prove that there wasn't any voting fraud, either.

A healthy democracy must avoid even the appearance of corruption. The Georgia and Nebraska elections fail this test. Once voting software is certified, it should not be changed - not eight times, not once. A backup voting method should be available, so if electronic machines fail or are compromised shortly before an election, they can be dropped.

Votes must be counted by people universally perceived as impartial. States should not buy machines from companies that have ties to political parties, and recent company executives should not be running for elections on those machines.

And every voter should see a paper receipt. This "voter-verified paper trail" should be retained, and made available for recounts - a low-tech check on the reliability of electronic voting. Most Americans would not do business with a bank that refused to provide written statements or A.T.M. receipts. We should be no less demanding at the polls. [Emphasis mine - K.]

Put simply, trust should not be an issue in any election. If fraud is alleged, then the state should prove that the vote was counted properly. When we allow our ability to verify that a vote was fairly cast and fairly counted, we start to hand our right to choose our own leaders over to others, who may not have the country's welfare at heart.

Every machine used to vote should produce a hard copy of that vote that can be verified by the voter as being accurate and which can be used if a recount is necessary. Each candidate should have the right to demand a paper recount if there are questions regarding the election, and the state should be able to prove that the votes were counted properly.

Posted by thorswitch at February 29, 2004 02:11 PM | TrackBack

Comments

With puclic key encryption and a printed ballot "receipt," voters could keep a copy of their ballot and call in to verify that their votes had been tallied as they cast them--all while maintaining voter privacy. I don't understand why this isn't a basic requirement for electronic/computerized voting.

Posted by: Elderbear at March 2, 2004 12:03 PM

Using voter receipts in a recount would be like trying to balance a bank's books by calling up every one who used the atm that day and using their receipts, would it not?
No system will ever be 100.000% perfect. But hey, what are the odds the margin of victory would every be less than the margin of error?

Posted by: pedro at March 3, 2004 06:11 AM